Anatomy of victory : why the United States triumphed in World War II, fought to a stalemate in Korea, lost in Vietnam, and failed in Iraq Cover Image

Book

Anatomy of victory : why the United States triumphed in World War II, fought to a stalemate in Korea, lost in Vietnam, and failed in Iraq / John D. Caldwell.

Caldwell, John Dean, 1940- (author.).

Summary:

"This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America's modern wars, analyzing how and why the United States has moved from success to failure since WWII. As the United States enters a new period of uncertainty in the world, Caldwell makes the compelling case that leaders must think, plan, and prepare before shooting." --Provided by publisher.

Record details

ISBN: 9781538114773
ISBN: 1538114771
Physical Description: xviii, 550 pages : illustrations, maps ; 24 cm
Publisher: Lanham, Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield, [2019]

Content descriptions

Bibliography, etc. Note:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 522-529) and index.

Formatted Contents Note:

Battle of Britain: winning by not losing -- Battle of the Atlantic: protecting the maritime lifeline -- Invasion of Russia: Hitler's strategic mistake -- Battle of El Alamein and operation torch: cracking German invincibility -- Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: regaining initiative in the Pacific -- Strategic bombing offensive: breaking German airpower -- Invasion of Italy: deciding to fight somewhere in Europe in 1943 -- D-Day and Battle for Normandy: retaking the Continent -- Battle for the Rhine: attacking Germany's vitals -- Battle of Okinawa and the bombing of Japan: ending the war -- The strategic architectures of World War II -- Battle of the Pusan perimeter: getting the most out of a bad situation -- Inchon: Operation Chromite: MacArthur's masterstroke -- Crossing the 38th parallel and driving north to the Yalu: the risks of overreaching -- Operations Ripper and Killer: recovery and frustration -- The strategic architectures of the Korean War -- Battle of Ia Drang Valley: not fighting the decisive battle -- Bombing campaign and high-tech initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White: airpower and technology indecisive -- The Pacification program (1967-1968): failing to change behavior -- The Tet Offensive (1968): strategic disaster -- Vietnamization: never a winning strategy -- The final years (1969-1975): the losing path -- The strategic architectures of the VIetnam War -- Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: defeating Saddam, losing politically -- Iraqi War II, 13-year air conflict: the limits of airpower -- Iraqi War III, invasion of Iraq: winning without an endgame -- Iraqi War IV, the insurgency and the surge (2007-2008): relearning counterinsurgency -- Iraqi War V, the rise of ISIS: a new, more violent enemy -- The strategic architectures of the Iraqi Wars.